Self-attribution of overconfident CEOs and asymmetric investment-cash flow sensitivity

Paul Moon Sub Choi; Chune Young Chung; Chang Liu

doi:10.1016/j.najef.2017.10.008

Self-attribution of overconfident CEOs and asymmetric investment-cash flow sensitivity

Paul Moon Sub Choi, Chune Young Chung, Chang Liu

Division of Business Administration

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we examine whether overconfidence coupled with a self-attribution bias affects the investment decisions of top corporate managers. First, overconfidence of chief executive officers appears to lead to the downward rigidity of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Additionally, overconfidence intensified by managerial self-attribution exacerbates the stickiness of investment-cash flow sensitivity. These results hold in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms with stronger results in the former. Overall, our findings are in line with the literature that lends support to the excessive investment commitment of overconfident managers.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-14
Number of pages	14
Journal	North American Journal of Economics and Finance
Volume	46
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2017.10.008
State	Published - Nov 2018

Keywords

Investment-cash flow sensitivity
Overconfidence
Self-attribution bias

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10.1016/j.najef.2017.10.008

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title = "Self-attribution of overconfident CEOs and asymmetric investment-cash flow sensitivity",

abstract = "In this paper, we examine whether overconfidence coupled with a self-attribution bias affects the investment decisions of top corporate managers. First, overconfidence of chief executive officers appears to lead to the downward rigidity of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Additionally, overconfidence intensified by managerial self-attribution exacerbates the stickiness of investment-cash flow sensitivity. These results hold in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms with stronger results in the former. Overall, our findings are in line with the literature that lends support to the excessive investment commitment of overconfident managers.",

keywords = "Investment-cash flow sensitivity, Overconfidence, Self-attribution bias",

author = "Choi, {Paul Moon Sub} and Chung, {Chune Young} and Chang Liu",

note = "Funding Information: Part of this research was conducted while Choi was a visiting scholar at the Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, funded by the grants provided by the Fulbright Scholarship Program and Ewha Womans University. The authors equally contributed to this work. We thank Warren Bailey, Hamid Beladi (Editor), Joung Hwa Choi, Andrew Karolyi, Young Han Andy Kim, and anonymous referees. Standard disclaimer rules apply and all errors are of our own. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Elsevier Inc.",

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AU - Liu, Chang

N1 - Funding Information: Part of this research was conducted while Choi was a visiting scholar at the Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, funded by the grants provided by the Fulbright Scholarship Program and Ewha Womans University. The authors equally contributed to this work. We thank Warren Bailey, Hamid Beladi (Editor), Joung Hwa Choi, Andrew Karolyi, Young Han Andy Kim, and anonymous referees. Standard disclaimer rules apply and all errors are of our own. Publisher Copyright: © 2017 Elsevier Inc.

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N2 - In this paper, we examine whether overconfidence coupled with a self-attribution bias affects the investment decisions of top corporate managers. First, overconfidence of chief executive officers appears to lead to the downward rigidity of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Additionally, overconfidence intensified by managerial self-attribution exacerbates the stickiness of investment-cash flow sensitivity. These results hold in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms with stronger results in the former. Overall, our findings are in line with the literature that lends support to the excessive investment commitment of overconfident managers.

AB - In this paper, we examine whether overconfidence coupled with a self-attribution bias affects the investment decisions of top corporate managers. First, overconfidence of chief executive officers appears to lead to the downward rigidity of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Additionally, overconfidence intensified by managerial self-attribution exacerbates the stickiness of investment-cash flow sensitivity. These results hold in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms with stronger results in the former. Overall, our findings are in line with the literature that lends support to the excessive investment commitment of overconfident managers.

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Self-attribution of overconfident CEOs and asymmetric investment-cash flow sensitivity

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Keywords

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