TY - JOUR
T1 - Relational pluralism in de novo organizations
T2 - Boards of directors as bridges or barriers to diverse alliance portfolios?
AU - Beckman, Christine M.
AU - Schoonhoven, Claudia Bird
AU - Rottner, Renee M.
AU - Kim, Sang Joon
PY - 2014/4/1
Y1 - 2014/4/1
N2 - This paper develops relational pluralism as a collective construct whose dimensions are heterogeneity, multiplexity, and asymmetry. Relational pluralism is instantiated in the board of directors, whose network of relationships influence a new venture's ability to establish external links beyond the networks of the founding team. We argue that relational pluralism speeds the establishment of a diverse alliance portfolio, which, in turn, speeds the attainment of major revenue milestones in a new firm. We examine these ideas in a population of de novo semiconductor firms and find that diverse alliance portfolios emerge faster when a board includes members with heterogeneous, multiplex relationships, as well as central network positions. However, the asymmetric influence of outside board members can have both positive and negative effects: the alliance formation process is aided by outsiders in central network positions, but impeded when central investors dominate the board. We discuss implications for our understanding of relational pluralism as a collective construct.
AB - This paper develops relational pluralism as a collective construct whose dimensions are heterogeneity, multiplexity, and asymmetry. Relational pluralism is instantiated in the board of directors, whose network of relationships influence a new venture's ability to establish external links beyond the networks of the founding team. We argue that relational pluralism speeds the establishment of a diverse alliance portfolio, which, in turn, speeds the attainment of major revenue milestones in a new firm. We examine these ideas in a population of de novo semiconductor firms and find that diverse alliance portfolios emerge faster when a board includes members with heterogeneous, multiplex relationships, as well as central network positions. However, the asymmetric influence of outside board members can have both positive and negative effects: the alliance formation process is aided by outsiders in central network positions, but impeded when central investors dominate the board. We discuss implications for our understanding of relational pluralism as a collective construct.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84900436141&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.5465/amj.2011.1068
DO - 10.5465/amj.2011.1068
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84900436141
SN - 0001-4273
VL - 57
SP - 460
EP - 483
JO - Academy of Management Journal
JF - Academy of Management Journal
IS - 2
ER -