Power allocation games for cooperative coordinated multipoint transmission scheme

Seunghyun Jung, Hyunggon Park

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Joint transmission, included in coordinated multipoint scheme, can improve the throughput of cell edge users by controlling transmit power of cooperating base stations. This, however, may cause another interference with inappropriate power allocation. In this paper, we model the power allocation of base stations as a game. The cooperating base stations are defined as players in the game and they allocate their power to maximize their utility. In the process, we consider the power constraints of cooperating base stations and the cost factor that reflects the degree of interference in other non-cooperating base stations. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in this power allocation game and the simulation results confirm that the proposed approach leads to an equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication19th Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management Symposium
Subtitle of host publicationManaging a World of Things, APNOMS 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages395-398
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781538611012
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2017
Event19th Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management Symposium, APNOMS 2017 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 27 Sep 201729 Sep 2017

Publication series

Name19th Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management Symposium: Managing a World of Things, APNOMS 2017

Conference

Conference19th Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management Symposium, APNOMS 2017
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period27/09/1729/09/17

Keywords

  • game theory
  • Joint transmission
  • Nash equilibirum
  • power allocation

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