Abstract
The phenomenon of a platform owner entering its complementor spaces has been growing and, given its potential impact on the dynamics of competition in platform-mediated industries, has captured the interest of entrepreneurs, scholars, and policy makers. Empirical studies on the consequences of such platform owner entry have been scant so far and show mixed results for complementors. Drawing on competitive dynamics theory, our paper revisits an implicit assumption held in extant studies that allows us to hypothesize on dissimilar entry modes across owners, to study the implications of entry mode differences. We argue that how an owner enters its complementor spaces drives the level of competitive pressure that such an entry exerts on the affected complementors. In turn, this determines the size and valence of the repercussions on complementors’ product performance as well as their responses. Drawing on platform theory, we argue that an owner’s mode of entry into complementor spaces relates to that owner’s approach to platform governance. Using a unique panel dataset of health and fitness mobile apps in the Apple iOS and Google Play store, our results support our prediction that the mode of entry plays a significant role in the resulting complementor dynamics. We find contrasting modes of entry and resulting dynamics that arise between a platform that follows a closed and reigning approach to governance and one that follows an open and laissez-faire approach. Our findings help explain apparent contradictions in prior studies and extend our understanding of this increasingly common phenomenon in platform-mediated industries.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1766-1800 |
Number of pages | 35 |
Journal | Journal of Management |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The authors thank the editor, Sali Li, and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and constructive feedback during the revision of the manuscript. The authors also acknowledge valuable feedback to earlier versions of this work from participants in seminars and presentations at Boston University, Singapore Management University, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, and Strategic Management Society Conference. This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Grant RG-201610-1321) and the Strategy Research Foundation Dissertation Research Grant (Grant SRF-2016DP-7766). The contents of this manuscript as well as errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors.
Funding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Strategic Management Society (Grant RG-201610-1321, SRF-2016DP-7766).
Funding Information:
The authors thank the editor, Sali Li, and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and constructive feedback during the revision of the manuscript. The authors also acknowledge valuable feedback to earlier versions of this work from participants in seminars and presentations at Boston University, Singapore Management University, Academy of Management Annual Meeting, and Strategic Management Society Conference. This research was funded in part by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Grant RG-201610-1321) and the Strategy Research Foundation Dissertation Research Grant (Grant SRF-2016DP-7766). The contents of this manuscript as well as errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Strategic Management Society (Grant RG-201610-1321, SRF-2016DP-7766).
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2022.
Keywords
- competitive dynamics
- complementor performance
- platform complementors
- platform governance
- platform owner entry