Abstract
For a digital signature scheme, unforgeability and non-repudiation are two main security requirements. In 2017, Galbraith, Petit and Silva presented GPS signature, an efficient isogeny based signature with a proven unforgeability. In this paper, we present a successful key substitution attack on GPS signature which threaten the non-repudiation of GPS signature. We also suggest how to prevent key substitution attack in general as well as our attack in this paper. We also present an example of our attack using Sage to illustrate isogenies of elliptic curves and our attack.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Information Security Theory and Practice - 12th IFIP WG 11.2 International Conference, WISTP 2018, Revised Selected Papers |
Editors | Chan Yeob Yeun, Olivier Blazy |
Publisher | Springer Verlag |
Pages | 63-77 |
Number of pages | 15 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030200732 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2019 |
Event | 12th IFIP WG 11.2 International Conference on Information Security Theory and Practices, WISTP 2018 - Brussels, Belgium Duration: 10 Dec 2018 → 11 Dec 2018 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 11469 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 12th IFIP WG 11.2 International Conference on Information Security Theory and Practices, WISTP 2018 |
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Country/Territory | Belgium |
City | Brussels |
Period | 10/12/18 → 11/12/18 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2019.
Keywords
- Isogeny-based signature
- Non-repudiation
- Post-quantum cryptography