Social networks provide interesting algorithmic properties that can be used to bootstrap the security of distributed systems. For example, it is widely believed that social networks are fast mixing, and many recently proposed designs of such systems make crucial use of this property. However, whether real-world social networks are really fast mixing is not verified before, and this could potentially affect the performance of such systems based on the fast mixing property. To address this problem, we measure the mixing time of several social graphs, the time that it takes a random walk on the graph to approach the stationary distribution of that graph, using two techniques. First, we use the second largest eigenvalue modulus which bounds the mixing time. Second, we sample initial distributions and compute the random walk length required to achieve probability distributions close to the stationary distribution. Our findings show that the mixing time of social graphs is much larger than anticipated, and being used in literature, and this implies that either the current security systems based on fast mixing have weaker utility guarantees or have to be less efficient, with less security guarantees, in order to compensate for the slower mixing.