TY - JOUR
T1 - Insurance Coverage and Health Care Spending by State-Level Medigap Regulations
AU - Park, Sungchul
AU - Coe, Norma B.
N1 - Funding Information:
Author Affiliations: Department of Health Management and Policy, Dornsife School of Public Health, Drexel University (SP), Philadelphia, PA; Department of Health Convergence, College of Science and Industry Convergence, Ewha Womans University (SP), Seoul, Republic of Korea; Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania (NBC), Philadelphia, PA. Source of Funding: This work was supported by grant R01 AG049815 from the National Institutes of Health. Author Disclosures: The authors report no relationship or financial interest with any entity that would pose a conflict of interest with the subject matter of this article. Authorship Information: Concept and design (SP, NBC); acquisition of data (NBC); analysis and interpretation of data (SP, NBC); drafting of the manuscript (SP); critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content (SP, NBC); statistical analysis (SP, NBC); obtaining funding (NBC); administrative, technical, or logistic support (NBC); and supervision (NBC). Address Correspondence to: Sungchul Park, PhD, Department of Health Management and Policy, Dornsife School of Public Health, Drexel University, Nesbitt Hall, 3215 Market St, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email: smp462@drexel.edu.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Ascend Media. All rights reserved.
PY - 2022/4
Y1 - 2022/4
N2 - OBJECTIVES: Medigap protects traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries against catastrophic expenses. Federal regulations around Medigap enrollment and pricing are limited to the first 6 months after turning 65 years old. Eight states institute regulations that apply to later enrollment; half use community rating (charging everyone the same premium) and half use both community rating and guaranteed issue (requiring insurers to accept any beneficiary irrespective of health conditions). We examined the impact of state-level Medigap regulations on insurance coverage and health care spending for Medicare beneficiaries. STUDY DESIGN: We used a retrospective cohort study design. Using the 2010-2016 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, we identified beneficiaries with TM only, TM + Medigap, or Medicare Advantage (MA) by state-level Medigap regulations. METHODS: Outcomes were insurance coverage and health care spending. We used an instrumental variable approach to address endogenous insurance choice. We conducted 2-stage least squares regression while controlling for individual-level characteristics and area-level demographic characteristics. Then we used the recycled prediction methods to predict enrollment and spending outcomes for the 3 state-level Medigap regulation scenarios. RESULTS: Although enrollment in TM only was consistent across regulation scenarios, the scenario with community rating and guaranteed issue had lower Medigap enrollment and higher MA enrollment than the no-regulation scenario. Despite negligible health differences, TM + Medigap beneficiaries had higher Medicare spending than TM-only beneficiaries, suggesting moral hazard. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest a link between additional regulations and lower Medigap and higher MA enrollment. Policy makers should consider the potential effects on insurance coverage, premiums, financial protection, and moral hazard when designing Medigap regulations.
AB - OBJECTIVES: Medigap protects traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries against catastrophic expenses. Federal regulations around Medigap enrollment and pricing are limited to the first 6 months after turning 65 years old. Eight states institute regulations that apply to later enrollment; half use community rating (charging everyone the same premium) and half use both community rating and guaranteed issue (requiring insurers to accept any beneficiary irrespective of health conditions). We examined the impact of state-level Medigap regulations on insurance coverage and health care spending for Medicare beneficiaries. STUDY DESIGN: We used a retrospective cohort study design. Using the 2010-2016 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, we identified beneficiaries with TM only, TM + Medigap, or Medicare Advantage (MA) by state-level Medigap regulations. METHODS: Outcomes were insurance coverage and health care spending. We used an instrumental variable approach to address endogenous insurance choice. We conducted 2-stage least squares regression while controlling for individual-level characteristics and area-level demographic characteristics. Then we used the recycled prediction methods to predict enrollment and spending outcomes for the 3 state-level Medigap regulation scenarios. RESULTS: Although enrollment in TM only was consistent across regulation scenarios, the scenario with community rating and guaranteed issue had lower Medigap enrollment and higher MA enrollment than the no-regulation scenario. Despite negligible health differences, TM + Medigap beneficiaries had higher Medicare spending than TM-only beneficiaries, suggesting moral hazard. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest a link between additional regulations and lower Medigap and higher MA enrollment. Policy makers should consider the potential effects on insurance coverage, premiums, financial protection, and moral hazard when designing Medigap regulations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85128291507&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.37765/ajmc.2022.88860
DO - 10.37765/ajmc.2022.88860
M3 - Article
C2 - 35420745
AN - SCOPUS:85128291507
SN - 1088-0224
VL - 28
SP - 172
EP - 179
JO - American Journal of Managed Care
JF - American Journal of Managed Care
IS - 4
ER -