Costs, Benefits and the Political Economy of Aid Coordination: The Case of the European Union

Stephan Klingebiel, Mario Negre, Pedro Morazán

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although it is not possible to identify a specific, theoretical optimum level of aid coordination for the European Union, there is a broad consensus on the need for reduced transaction costs and greater impact through a stronger adherence to coordination standards. However, neither member states nor European institutions consequently follow a policy in line with a clear coordination principle. And nor do partner countries always push for more donor coordination. This article uses evidence from two country case studies, Myanmar and Rwanda, in which a conducive aid coordination environment is assumed. The former represents the new foundation of an aid architecture in a country, thus expecting the application of high aid effectiveness standards. The latter consists of a partner government with a strong leading role in aid. Although the political economy of donors and partner countries does not always favour coordination, strong recipient government leadership is crucial to align developmental objectives and clearly establish comparative advantages and division of labour among donors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)144-159
Number of pages16
JournalEuropean Journal of Development Research
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI).

Keywords

  • aid coordination
  • aid effectiveness
  • European Union
  • Myanmar
  • Rwanda
  • transaction costs

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