Compensation disparity between risk averse agents under adverse selection and moral hazard

Sung Hyun Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We extend the LEN moral hazard model to allow for adverse selection and derive the optimal incentive contract menu. We show that both moral hazard and adverse selection separately cause compensation disparity between agents with different degrees of risk aversion. We also show that adverse selection aggravates the compensation disparity when more risk averse agents form a minority of the agent population.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)74-91
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory and Econometrics
Volume32
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jun 2021

Keywords

  • Incentive Contract
  • LEN Model
  • Pay Gap

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